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9 Summary, conclusions and outlook 
In this final chapter we v~dh first (in section 2 )  provide m overwie\+r of our main argumemts 
and findings in this study. We uislll then broaden our scope by Identifj~ng the main 
contaib~ations we feel our research makes to rhc existing body of knowledge in a number of 
areas (scrliun 3). Finally, in section 4, urc conclude by idcntify~ng limitations and possible 
fiiture extensions lo our work. 
2 Siun~maay of study setu~p and fi~udilngs 
Over the past 20 years a host of books and articles werc devoted to nnanagersi owncrs of 
dcolmn~erc~al) businesses. The (often impl~cit) idea behind this interest is, chat in many 
companies the mal~a-tager's influence is so 2318, that the decrsions taken ca rv  a dist~nct mark 
of their originator's character. In other words: the personal background of thc manager is 
tllought to be reflected in the company's actions. If this line of reasoning is extended to 
managing learns, being small ~ollectives of pouer~ul  individwsls, we lnay expect 
comparable influences of the particular cornposition of teams on their company's decisions, 
actioms and results. Hambrick and Mason (1984) captured the latter idea in a rheorcrical 
kan-uework that came to be knovva~ as t11e upper cchclo17s nrodel or theory. In this modell 111c 
f a ~ u s  is on the impact of team composition variables (e.g., average and spread of age, 
tenure, functional and educational backgrounds) on dependen! variables like profitability, 
growth, inrrovatiweness and strategic direction. The upper echelons model spawned a 
multikdc of empirical studies testing its hypotheses In the following dccades. 
In Chapter 2 we critically rev~ewed a number orthese studics and concluded that the 
empirlca2 field is still very Fragmented and methodologically flawed. Moreover, no aflenapt 
has heen made as yet to include team tnernber personality variety as an explanatory variable 
of  strategic firm behavior. Because of its proven validity in the s t~ldy of ir~dividual 
managers, as s h o w  in Chapter 3, we chose to research the impact of a team's composition 
w~t-h regard to its members' control perceptions on a team" actions and results in a 
simulated business setting. Of252 individuals fanning 58 participating Icams, the locus of 
conml was measured using a validated pcrsonal~ty inventory. 'rhese individuals could then 
b e  classified as 1rolding either more internal or more extenzal perceptions of control. In order 
to  classifi teams according to their members' locus of control, we designaxed t~trms 
consisting of more than two-third zrrten~al membcrs as an intenmal team and Learns with rnorc 
[ha11 two-tt~ird external members as an external team. Teams wgth relatively balanced 
nurnbcrs of internals and externals were designated 'mixed teams" 'Thesc procedur-cs and 
our data are described in detail in Chapter 4. 
Afier the chapter 3 review of individual psycholog~cal research idsing the J O ~ U ~  of 
cantrol concept , we devclaped a conceptual framework in  order ta explain perrol-snance 
dlffcrcnces between differently composed teams. This framework was based on the stylioed 
fact that intemals are better managers than externals. Assuming that these tendencies would 
wanslate to f ie  team level, we expressed the rnetahypolhesus that thc superiority of internal 
trams aver external teams may be caused 'by either superior skrateglc choices (Chaptcr 6) 
and/or by superaor strategy nr~skir~g (Chapters 7 and 8). Svategy making in our vlew consists 
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of thee interrelated prwesscs. First is environmental scannlng through relevant ~n-rhrnatlon 
gatlzerang (Chapter 7); secoind is the: taking of consistent and planned action (also in Chapter 
7) and thrrd is the adaptation of action patterns if necessary (treated in Chapter 8). Thus, 
internal teams are expected to be generally better at these strategy making sktlls than nxred 
and extcrnal teams. It is important to note that the impact of personality diEerences 
are generally more pronounced in relar~vely uncertain and ambipous situations rhan in more 
secure and clearly smctvred sltuatlons In our set-up this a m b i g u l ~  relates to the amount 
of dynamism in the industry In which a team competes. We therefor expected the differences 
between {cam typestlo be generally greater in dynamic than nn stable rndustries, 
In rhc empirical chapters 5 to 8 we formally tested ow hypotheses. The foillosving selves as 
a review of our main findings. 
In chapter 5 we started by looking whether internal teams, because oftheir skills, did 
indeed perform better (in terns of profits and market shares) than d ~ d  mixed and external 
teams. This appeared to be the case and the difference was strongest in dynamic 
enwirontnents where team t ype  explained almost 40% of all variation in profitability! I t  was. 
however, not external but mixed teams that did worst. The idea that mixing personality types 
would be beneficial in dynamic environme~~ts was strongly rejected, indicating to the 
conkary, that in these circumsranccs it is better to be alike than to be differend. Thls implies 
that simply adding inkemals to a Learn can lcad to lower performance ifthe result is a rnixed 
tcarn! The bad record of mixcd teams may have something to da with their difficulty In 
rernchii~g soda1 team integration because of their personality differences. This hal~dicnp may 
have proved to be especially crucial in dynamic env~ranments, Possibly, ifwe had witnessed 
these teams over a longer period af  time, they miglit have overcame their difficulties and 
realized thenr potential. 
In a first arte~npt at explaining the performance differences betaeen team typcs, wc looked 
at Ihe spcclfic curtratfr of tlwr strategic choices in Chapter 6.  Posstbly, internal teams \ware 
bettar because they engngcd ~n the more profitable actions, The cxisting l~terature ilnld~~afed 
tl~ree types af stmteglc preferences orn whish internal and external people may dirfe-r 
inlernnls shouQd be rnurr: Innovutive, risk-taking and cooperadvc, 1'3zesc general differences 
wcrc 8701 Ifouud, Ir~silead, intcrnal teams innovated and cooperated more only in dynamic 
environments wlrere a strong association exists bet\l\icen these chaises and profitabillry, but 
grot in stable environments where thcsc associations do not exist. l'hts indicates, that internal 
learns do not syslernatically ]make a'?ferep~r~r! decisions, but ha1 they rtzir'or- their choices to 
ensuing circunrstenccs. This will prow to lobe o recurrent finding. 
With regard to difFesenccs in strategy nrakiilg, i.e. the way in which strateg~es are 
slzapcd, the following was found in chapter 7 and 8. First we focussed an the scanning nf the 
enwronment, i.e., on the exlcnt ofitf~flned ncl'rurr. courrm-y to our expectations, iealn types 
did nut appear to diffcr in the amount of money tt~cy spent to buy infomatian. Iln\tfever, 
.cvl~en we look at the degree to wlzicfi specilk actions were preceded by a relevant (for that 
dceisisn) informalion request, important differences did appear, lntenlal teams tunled out 
EO be better informed than external teams on matters that indicated the eiTectiveness of thcir 
awn behawor. This points at a certain pragsnatism from the side of internal teams: they are 
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most laterested in whai their own actions can accomplish. Not that h i s  fits perfectly ~ / i &  
their internal control percephons. External teams, on the ather hand, a p v a ~ d  rno~st keen on 
all kinds of information regarding the actlons of compe~tops, that 1s: outward bound 
infamation. Our analysis shawed, as colnmonm sense would dictate, tlret gathehng 
in.folm~ation is sbonger associated with profitability in dynamic than in stable enlriroran~ents. 
Inrema1 teams seem to have grasped this point very well: they are more active at infonnalron 
gathering in dynamic than in stable environments. External teams again appear to be bad 
adaptors: they do exactly the opposite. 
The second strategy making variable studied in chaptcr 7, was the: amount do which 
cortcerled action was taken. This should be reflected in planned, coherent nrzd persistent 
action patterns. Concerning pla~wing, ~nternal teams reached the highest overall qualrty of 
planning. It is, however, nor external but mixed teanls who do worst in this respect. As 
careful s~mullaneous fitting ofvarious company processes is crucial in reaching good overall 
plaalning, mixed teams' integration weakness may have been a particularly selrioi~s drawback 
in this task. Wqen we look at differences bemeen stable and dynamic environmeallts, we see 
that external teams plan better in stable environme~~&, whereas internal teams p h a  better i n  
dynarulc environments. Planlung quality was Tbund to bc stronger associated with Gnanlcial 
success in dynamic than in stable industries, sorncthing which makes intuitive sense: bad 
planning is probably more costly in a fast changing et~vimnrnent t'han in the case of a 
predicable environment. Internal teams seem ka have appreciated this idea: they plan more 
when plmnnmg is more important and (consequently) more profitable. In other words: thcy 
show more adapted behavior. 
The coherence of strategies did not differ between teams. However, intenlial teams 
showed less internal coherence in dynamic than in stable environments. 7'he opposite 1s true 
for external teams. This indicates, that internal teams defincd 'looser' strategies in case of 
a changing environment than in case of a stable environment. Although this may be 
interpreted as an attempt to retain some strategic leeway in a clna~lglng context, this did not 
prove to be more profitable in our case. If we look at the pe?:~listcmee of strategic positions 
aver time, no team type differences are found: all tlcslrns were equally persistent in heir  (not) 
holding on to a chosen strategic profde. Still, the by now familpar qualitative pattern surfaces 
again: internal teanls are more persistent than other team types in stable environ-lme~~ts (few 
tseasons to change if the current course is satisfactoiy), but the team type differences vanish 
in dynamic contexts. 
In the results reported it was shown that the supenorilly of ~nternal teams is not due to what 
they do, but to what they do under what circumstances. J i  seems as though internal learns 
simply have a better 'Eedlrng' for what behavior is most appropriate given  he ensuing 
condit~ons: they adapt: the~r behavior to fit the env~ronmenml contingencies. In chapter 8 we 
attempt to obscrvc this 'adaptatioaz effect' (~.e.,  the third aspect of sh-ategy rnaklng) more 
directly by looking at strategic change activity and change reactions foElowing the feedback 
teams received concerning their past performance. It tunled out, that external teams were 
generally most restless: they changed course most regardless of their perfomance. Some 
kind of continuous unrest characterizes their behavior no matter what the circumstances. 
Negative performance feedback appewed to positively influence the amount of change of 
all teams only at the beginning of the game and not thereaffer. We drd find, as hwothes~zed, 
that external teams have more diffi~ulty in making controlled reactions b negative fcedbiack. 
T h a t  IS: they either change a lot or only very little. Internal teams show more controlled 
change reactions to negative performance feedback. 
Taken together, we may conclude that the cmcial difference between internal and external 
teams appears to be their ability to find responses that suit the environmental demands of 
the moment. Internal teams are generally better at doing that than are external teams. 
Compared to both homogeneous internal and external teams, mixed teams appear to suffer 
from a handicap ofpoor social integration which may, however, diminish over time. We: 
may infer from all this, that in fast changnng and uncertain task environments it is best to 
form a team consisting of internal members, as they have great capabilities of confidenrfly 
steering themselves through the vagaries of such contexts. In relatively stable and 
predictable task environments, personality effects are generally much weaker if clear 
behavioral gu~delines exist. Still, external teams seem especaally well  suited In these types 
of environments. En fact they may be especially motivated for and good ad scrupulous tasks 
of planning and coordinating, i.e., in bureaucratic work. Given that such stable contexts 
provide little oppontunilies for personal control, it is likely .to bore and undermine the 
rnotmvatlon of internal teams. Making internal teams perform these kinds of work is therefor 
a waste of resources. On the other hand putting external tearns in complex and dynamic 
sir~tarions is likely to overburden their coping mecha~zlsrns leading lo conhsion and strategic 
dr~ft.  Contrary to the often acclaimed benefits ofteam vanety, we arc i~zclined to recommend 
no mixvng of extremes of this particular personality trait within teams. This rccommendatllon 
against mixed teams is, liowever, provisional as their social dynamics and behavior nn the 
long run are not yet hl ly understood. Apart from these recommendations of matching team 
types to (task) environments, it is important to stress that payoff of teamwork can only occur 
whcn teams have pea t  latitude of action. Tn other words: they need authority and amplc 
resources ('ec~j~owennent') in order lo realize their potential. This will lead to ernpo~vered 
teams fiulctioning in cnviro~nmcnts that have greatest reinforcing power on the things they 
are good at. 
3 Mttir~ scie~llfffl~ contributions 
We !hink this study has cant~ibuteci to our understna~ding in three related areas of inquiry, 
i s , ?  team studies in the uppet echelons tradition, ir~dividual diflercnces at a team level arad 
organizational economics. We will discuss these three below. 
Farst, regarding the upper echelons tradition, we answered a repeated call for the 
nnclirsio~i of psychologica8 variables in the study of team composithon. Our effort in this 
respect was rather successfull, as In the end we were able to explain about one third of ail 
performance variation in dy.nainic contexts by the teams' locus of control make up. 
Furthern~ore, we were able to indicate and rest several lncclhanisms through which this 
influence is brougl~r about. It is inipol;tanr to note, however, that our success was crriically 
dependent on the extensive theoretical and empirical past research that exists in relation to 
locus of control. Psychological studies have produced many findings on irrdlvidual 
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differences regarding, for ~nstance, attention, infannation handling, risk t k i n g  and 
adjustment. Past Locus of control research already shou~ed its relevance in managnz.rent 
seXzlngs, although the richness of the construct was not yet fully exploited, especially with 
regard to the process of strategy making. The point we want to rn~ake IS, that in isdating 
psych~logacal variables for upper echelons studies ~t is very important that they lmve a 
strong face validity hn relation to the management task under sh~dy,  plus preferably an 
exterislve background of empirical and theoretical research. Tlris es necessary not only to 
predict effects, but also to interpret and test explanations ofwilzj~ the eflects occur. ?'he latrer 
is a general weakness in most upper echelons studies to date which wc tried to overcome in 
the present study by explicitly testing the intemrediate ~~~echanisrns that are expecled to 
paroduce the perfomlance differences. Furthermore, a stroia-rg theoretical backgrortnd also 
cnablles to predict ~nteractions with situational variables. Moderating effects are not yet very 
oftem1 tested in upper echelons studies, possibly because their specifica~ion wo~ild involve 
mare precision than available theory and research findings allow for. In our satdy, 
cnvu-onmental dynamism turned out to be an extren~cly important moderator varlable as 
many effects predictably differed between dynamic and stable cirlcumstances. Finally, we 
fol l~wed the call to broaden upper echelons studies through experimentak methods. Our 
research underscores the potential fruithlness of using the experinrental method ta deepen 
our knowledge of management team composition effects. For instance, a classic problem in 
rrppcr echelons studies has been the identificatvon of the top p u p  of people that really take 
the important decisions. Usually very bold and imprecise nletlaods were used to identie the 
main players at the top, e.g., formal pos~tilans stated in standard col-porate reference books, 
We narrowed down the group of decision makers by asking team members lo rate cach 
other's relative partic~pation. This enabled us lo prevent the diluting effect of 'bystanders" 
characterisGcs on team composition variables and define a 'core team' of influential decision 
makers. Tn doing so, our mcasurement precision was enhanced. Other important benefits of 
experimental Ifteam) studies which we exploited, was the complete cont~ol over game-related 
irafonnation input for decisions, a conrplete transparency of actions/decisions and n highly 
comparable decision environment. All three are mucl~ more difficult lo obtain in real 
conrpany samples. 
Second, we also tried to contrlbvte to the study of individual differences at a group 
level. We slrowed that individual differences In control perceptions can have predictable 
effccts 011 rlre level of the group as well. Spccificallly, we wen: able to show that Ibchaviccml 
tendencies of ~ndividuals tend to show up in g r o ~ ~ p  actions and results as well if  a rmajority 
of its members c a w  internal or external characteristics. However, it is obvious, that the 
group adds a layler of complexity to the effects of individual properties as the interaction 
among members enters the ptcture. This is why we included the muxing hypotheses in 
Chapter 5. Although not observed directly, the bad results ofmixed learns and their planning 
difficulties indirectly hint at soc~all and/or cognitive lntcgration difliculties 11.1 l~eterogcneous 
groups. 'lhe rnam question to be answered then, is: to what cxtent are group actions and 
outcomes determined by individual tendencies on the one hand and social forces on the 
othcr? In other words: under which circumstances (or when) do certain socual hctors 
outtveigh individual differences in determining group actions and outcomes? In this respect 
ut slrouid be noted, that we have trodden on dangerous ground between social science 
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d~scipl~rres, Historically, a heated debate exists as to the proper level of analysis in group 
research. Soclal psychology, its prime discipline, is divided In a number of hctlons that 
hake, over time, shown an increasing ~sollarlon VIS-8-vis each other (House, 1977). Broadly 
speaking there is a clash between bottom up approaches, describ~ng roup behavlor from the 
perspective of the Individual and lop-dawn approaches looking at the rmpact of group 
phenomena (especially group structure) on individuals. The first approach emanates from 
psychoiogy, the second from sociology. Various writers on social psychology have 
identified thls divide, even calling it a 'cnisisVn Be advancement of social psychology and 
plcad for a recionciliat~on of the two'. In essence, it boils down to a very old problem ~n 
social science centering around the exact interplay between the ~ndlv~dual nd the collective 
(Allport, 1962). Our own research stumbled upon this Issue as we could exp1al-n group 
outcomes by rcferenee to the accumulation of certatn ~ndividnual characteristics (in case of 
the tntemal and exlerlial teams), but were only partly and indirectly able lo explain the 
actions and outcomes of teams with heterogeneous cornposit~ons [mixed teams). To get out 
of the crisis, Steiner (1986: 285) contends that "'(.,.) it is not my cantenhon that 
individual~stic social psychology should somehow be suppressed and replaced by a more 
'gmoupy' vanety. But i~idividualistic social psychology should be combined and coordtnated 
wltli an allmost nonexistent social psychology of csl/ective behavior, witl~out which it often 
provides a d~storted picture of the individual's functio~aing". We think that the same holds 
for the fiinctioning, behavior and outcomes of the group: individualistic and scrclal factors 
should be studled concornrlantlly in order lo do jushce to their intricate interplay in 
dete~m~ining outcomes. 
Third, we tried to contribute to the field of organizational economrcs by showing the 
potentials for explaining economic behavior when the assumption of homogeneous decision 
makers is abandoned, When confronted with similar economic problems and trade-offs, we 
showed that people's behavior is ~rnportantly affected by their assessment of the 
environment and of then possibilif es to influence the ourconies of their actions. In short: 
cconomic drecislo~~ making, both individually and i n  groups is predictably influenced by 
aspects of personallly, ioi our case control perceptions 
4 Limllntiarrs and future research 
Below we will d i s c~~ss  five areas in which our work can be extended in future. 
The cxteman walidaty of tlze curael~t s t ~ ~ d y  cr~lically depends on the realism of the 
sirrzulatiot~ tllat was offered. We h n k  that the garne, the population of subjects and the 
iticenlives, provided a realistic mirror o f  business declsican making and competition in a 
marker of z~iom~opalisac competition between five fimls. We already elaborated on that polllr 
in Clrapler 4. Howevcr, in the end a $\mulation always remains a sltnplificatuon ofreality' 
' FOI e!aboaare treatments on h e  labos~ou~s sel;ltlonsh~p between psychology and socrology legardmg tlr~s Issue see 
Allport [1962), Stemlet. (19741% Arcllrzbald (197G), House (197?), Strykrr (11977), Backn~an (1983) and Ste~nler (1986) 
"ore rllnt In older to be exlernally valid WL& regard to complexnty, the game does Elor need to be as co~nplex as ;a real 
busuiess environment. Gwen people=s cognitive hrn~ls 011 processnng mfomlatlon (Sumon 1955, 1957), it  only needs 
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arhere the ultimate test should take place. An obvious next step therefore, is to test the stated 
hypotheses in sanrples of real managenrent teams in business. In order to do this, careful 
selection of the research p~pulatiolz is warmanted not to fall1 victins to the wireaknesses aipast 
upper echelons research. In particular, it is important. first, to select irrdustries that clearly 
differ in t e r n s  of relevant research varrakiibles, like in our case environl~sental or industq 
d ynamisrn. This enables the testlng of (interaction-) l-rypotheses between environmental 
settings. Second, it is important that firm management ~?itl.lin the irrdustq has consrderable 
(p~feeaably high) managerial discretion, that is: management's impact on firm decisions to 
be studied naust be strong. Third, a precise dclinea~ion of the dominant coalition to observe 
must be esiablished. This rules out corporate reference books and calls for more intensive 
methods like ~ntewiews, sociome'try (Moreno, 1960) or, very promising, network analysis 
[CoilE~nu, 1998). We think that only tlys kind of measurement precision and research set up 
can deepen our unsights Into the effects of (psychological) team cornposhtiion. 
A second area that needs attentloll iar future research is the social process by which 
team composition affects c~rganizal~onal outcomes. 'This has hardly been irzvesligaiaed in 
upper echelons atudncs at large. Our awn research only indirectly hinted at the importance 
of soclal rrrteraclisn between (rnlxed) team members in determining outcomes and it 1s 
perfectly co~iceivablle that much of the relative success of internal teams is also explainable 
by the way they dealt with each other. Our review in Chapter 3 hinted at nrany possible 
tl.nersrctzcal and empirical starting points for studying intenlals' and externals"roup 
behavior, Of course a wealth of mare general studies into group inlcractlon, functioning or 
structuring already exists in the group dynamics literature (see, for instance, Shaw ( 1  98 1) 
or Fossyth (1990)). When pursued, this future line of research requires methods of close and 
stlvctured observaflon of group processes using, far instance, interact~an process analysis 
[Bales, 19510; 1.980). Close obscfwation of real management teams may, however, run into 
practical difficulties as the teams should grant the researcher repeated access to their 
n~eetings. If thas problem is encountered, the only ways to resolve ie will be to study elthes 
nmrc easily accessible groups with comparably difficult tasks or to start off with in-depth 
case stLzdies and comparisons of only a few top teams that are willing to lend full 
cooperation. More expcslmentally-orierited methods may also be used to ilavestigaie haw 
control perceptions in a group aiFfect its internal functioning. 
Tllird, research should be aimed at studying team collaposution effects using longer 
time-.vliindow;s. Most TM'T research to datekernploys cross-sectional data wlvich make it 
impossible to infer the causality of vaaiolns effects. Moreover, many impoilant issues rn 
strdcgy making, far instance adaptation research, can only bc studaed in a longirud~nal 
fashion. Especially strategic reorientation procesess often (but not always) take many years 
to be desvgrred and imple~nented But top rnanagemenh teams themselves also change over 
ill-rre andl the changung or replacement of lop managers has in fact been proposed and studncd 
as a conscious adaptation method of ltselC(Sc1ueuder el. a!., 1991; Hambrrck and D "ven~, 
to have a iomplexrfy beyond man=> cagn~llve processing 11mrts 111 order to be seal~stio fro111 the playerss v~eu~point. 
Ihat IS:  11 shaluld be cornplex enough, wt~ich we think the current game 1s 
The swd~es  by tlambrlck and D-Avenn (1988, 1992) are mportant exccptrons 
1988; 1992). 
Fourth, interesting avenues for %%re research ID upper echelons exzst in the area of 
top management team formation, i,e., nn the question as fa  what ir3divodual characteristics 
are important to get to the top. In taking an evolutllonaly point of view, ~t may be very 
woflhwh~le to study the seleclion and attraction of managers into organizations and top 
positions. As we already mdicated, these selection criteria may differ substantially beween 
industries as well as between individual orgarrizallons. What are these (implicit) selection 
criteria'? How arc profiles of suitable manager characteristics in organizat~ons or indusmies 
formed and how does selection based on individual clraracteristics into higher echelons take 
place? Do ma13agement teams simply ' reproduce ' themselves or do suitable management 
profiles change over time? If so: what are the circumstances that trigger adaptations in the 
selection procesges? On the other hand, dnfferent individuals may be atitraemf to careers in 
different types of organizations and industrics. What are the differences between these 
individuals? Do they screen organizations for a match with their personal characte~istics and 
if so: how? Docs this match have an effect on their career advancement? 
A final proposal for future research is i n  the broadening of upper echelons studies to 
a higher level of analysis, like for instance economic sectors, industries, businless groups or 
managerial elitcs that con~ect  various organizations or industries. It is still an open question 
whether and how psychoPogical characteristics of teams of economic decision makers affect 
(larger parts of) the economy. Jm industries with unconstrained and influential management 
teams, these teams are more likely to have their personality make-up reflected in their 
policies than lame: Eearns that have their hands tied to their backs. Consequently, economrc 
business behavior is more likely to be 'personalizedYin the former than in the latter 
ir3dustries. Note however, that personality effects on the level of economies will only be 
traceable if Between- seiefor variation in the personality of management teams is higher than 
within-sector variation. 'This is not at all implausible. Personalities in different subsections 
of the economy may well differ because the composition of the economy's managerial elite 
is ruled by sacial and economic attraction and selection forces determining who gets to the 
top ilncl wlro doles not (Schneider, 1987). The basis on? which people are, selected and 
amrtlcied (in3110 jobs rrray vary between different subsections of the economy, thus creatlng 
diffcrentitltion of types of people In different subsections. For instance, stable or 
bureaucratic enviroraments may provide rn attractive and motivating employment setting far 
persons that llikc n clear, secure and directing environment [l.e., externals), whereas it is 
baring and frustrating for people who want to mould their own ertvlronment and like to feel 
itu control (LC., rnte17aals). A good nratch between job environment and personality is likely 
to lead to more motivation and upward mobility. 'Thus, externals may be attracted to and 
prormated in ddferent industries or environments than internals. This will in turn influence 
and/or strengthen the social and economic behavioral properties of thcse indmstrres. 
Likewise, thc ccononnnc and legal ciscuii-rstances under which entrepreneurs are to start news 
businesses co-determines the (psyel~ological) composition of the pool of successrul 
errt~~cpreneiurial talent through a similar attraction and selection, process. This will in tun? 
affect the extent and mix of new economic initiatives and the structure of the economy. 
Technical industries (steel, cl-iernicals) are also likely to attract different people than 'social" 
rndustl-ies (advertising. marketing, consultancy). These are just a few examples of 
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mechan.isrns that warrant ffiFuhnre research at higher levels of analysis. This kind of researclu 
ad& an interesting (macro-)sociological flavor to the study of vary powerr.fui upper echelons 
with far-reaching influence on entire business systems or econo~~ ie s .  Again, this type of 
research 1s not easy, but its potentials seem worth the effort. 
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING f SUMMARY hi'r DUTCH 
Coeilrole Percepties op Team FSi\;eaiu en Concurrentiegedrag 
Een Experimentele Studie 
Inleiding: het belang van psychologische variabeleni in team studies 
Oxer de laalsre T0 Jaar zijn lalrljke artikelen eli boeken gew~id aai? de persoali vtui de 
oiudemcrnei- of' bednjfsleuder De achrerliggende idee huerb11 IS, dat 111 veel ondc~memingei~ deze 
bedryfsleider eer1 demmte g a t e  ir-rvloed laeefl op de beslrssirigeii die genomen wardeal, dar ~i.eel 
liai? die beslissingen eer1 typiscli sterzipel var1 huil bederrkcr zuilen dragen. Met daiders woorden 
de pcrsoorzlgke acl-itergrond wan de iuaririger 'weegt door' in zij11 ondemcmingsgedrag en 
daarmee in de aard eiu resultateia van de oiidciiieniiiig. D C L ~  gedachtc Iiecfl geleid tot een 
slorlvlocd aai? empilrisclre slzudles die cerr verbalid Irac11rei-i ie  onldckkcn trisseir cigenscl-ruppcii 
vaLr de bedrijfsleider enerzijds ei1 lal va11 arrdernemings- en strategiekenmerkeii anderzijds 
Iii bet verlengde Izienarw rnag worden vcmtacht dat kenmerken vain tcn~ns, als collccticl 
v u i ~  iridividueil, veagelgkbare invlocdeia z~tllen uitocfe'cet~ op onclcrneri11ngsvariabe1er1 D e ~ c  
grdiachte weid i n  1954 door Hambrick en Mason van de Amcnkaanse Coluiribia Uni.vcrsitcit i11 
een theoretisch raamwerk gevat oiider de naam krrppcr echelons tl-ieoiy! H~erbij gaat hcc diis om 
dc invloed ban leui?isamenste/Sii?g~ke~~~r~crk~~~ (bij voorbeeld gemiddelde ei? spreiding va11 
Iceftijd, ambtsreri~iijn, fii.ii~ctlolzele n aple~dirigsach~erg~o~~dcn) op raken als winstgevetrdheid, 
groei. iniiovatrzii~eit en strategisclzc koers 
Deze theoretrsclue voorzet 11eeiR geleld tot een indnikwekkend aantal einpirischc studies 
(.tie I-ioofdstuk I ) ,  dze eclitei een grote vcrsi-iippcrnng van aandaclat en onilsai~lreirl~aiigei~de 
(rion)resultateii te ~ i e n  geeft Een fuildainenteler bezwaar kan wol-den aangetekend iegcïi de 
grove bel~andeling die hel individuele keci~eproces i11 de 'upper cchcloi-rs' benadering teti deel 
\al t  door middel van demogralischc variabelen In esselutie nordl er vanriit gcgaan dat incilsen 
inci cesi bepaald demogriifiscl.i kei~ailerk zoals lecfiqd cen homogene groep \lonncn niet 
vergelijkbare karakters, attrtudes c11 livaarden clie Ilcir daarom int vcrgcl~lkbaar. gedrag rian~ctLcn 
Deze ,~~titudes en \liaardeia i e 6  iloch huil (\,eionderstiel~le) iclatil: nlel dl: ~3ei-iiwgaé1iix"l"c 
ipariabeleil, worden cchtei- teldei-i v:isngcsieid Ilierdoor blljfi tic ilraizier ikalerop dciaïogra[ic 
gedrag bciilivloedt ondulcleLi~ik, hetgecri, tot wilde specuillatics Icidl waïineer cc12 vcrbatud nici 
ectirii~.~~~isch kan  worden w  ast gesteld Een mllu.iira!ie Hambrick en Masoli (1954) citcreir onderzoek 
dat erop ~ ? j s t  dal nuanagers raiet cen lage sociaal-ecoiioii~isclic dchtcrgrond mccr ovcriinmcs c i ~  
dll,ersiricaties !slegeir. Z ~ J  doen dir "ver-ii~ottlcS!~k met heii doel ei-kcili~iiig en waardei-i~ag te 
unl\'nngeii" (pag 201, onze vertalui-ig en c~rrsiverrog). Echlei-. waiitrccr Ilaii~brick eiï Mus011 
hieruln een llypolbese op team Iluvedu dflc~dc~l I Z O L L ~ C I Y  LC eeniuoirdig vacl anan hel siiolpclc 
verband russen aiclirtergrorid en diversificdtic Of hogcrc 'behoefte aan waardering' irldcidaad kot 
dixercifícalie Veldt blijft hicrdoor ondiiidelijk, csein~o dc rclatrc l~isscna sociale achtergioncl ril 
TbcllcieRe aar, u acirdcnngVn plci:its I~isl-varr i lordl een ~ b r ~ a k k c i  (vcroriderstcld) corre1;i:ir vaia 
"belroefte aan \vaardering', namell~k sociale aclrtergronc\ gcbruiikt om dc mate va11 dz.irersilica2iai 
re ~oorspellel.i K o ~ o n ï  alle eilectcn 7.1~17 eigenlijk m a k k c  afgclcliden wan dieper Iiggeiade 
persocpilskenmerkc die zeldeli of iiooil rcclitsi~.c~ks worden gciilctcn. b11ea kwarit nog bij dar de 
afgclcldc ged~agsconseq~ncrutlies vaii deinografisclze variabelen zcer chvers ei? COTIIS  cli is 
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conflicterend kunnen zzrjn Zo ~ o r d t  een hoge gemiddelde leefinjd van lact team gewoonliijk 
opgevat als een rndrcatie van meer ewanng en routin~e, die poslrief uilttverkt op taakpresralies 
Aan de andere kant kat3 dnc Iceftijd ook rot conservatisme oT zelfs fysieke (r lil b gehcuaen-) 
achteruitgang lelden, hetgeen een negatleve uitwerking kan hebber1 Wzq anenen dat hei gebruik 
.van 'afstandelijke~ennograif~sche variabelen veel vaal! de teleurstellende resulrarcn in bet 
empjnsch onderzoek tot op heden zou kunnen verklaren. 
Een onrieszoeksgebied dal zoveel nota-resultaten heen opgeleverd (52% iri ons ovem;chl, 
kppcndix A) doet er goed aan eerr stap tewg te zetten rn de causale keien door de 
onderliggende (prc)dispositics zklfreclilslreeks te Inieten cn deze vervolgens aan gedrag, keuzcs 
en uiltciiidelijk presiaties te relalerepr Een focus op mees fuindarnezztele gedragstendensen i.oals 
tiie in  de persoonlnjkheid zijn gewarteld Iijkt op zijn plaats aangezien zij d~rccter aan her gedrag 
dijn gekoppeld en een meer taiide meting van waarden en ciltitudcs oplekerela dan 
demografisclie vaslabelen DIL punt werd, vreemd genoeg, wc1 door Harnbrick en Mason erkend 
[oeia t i j  cteldmi dat ""hei twqfelachiiig IS,  of deze onderzoekssnroom verder roaruat kan komeai 
~ont ler  een grotere aandacht voor de relevanie literatuur in verwante onder~oeksveldcn, zoals 
psycl-iologle en socsale psychologie" (I-Iambrlck and Mason, 1984, p. 203, on7e vertaling) He~n 
izsdruk op 'observeerbare' keinmcrken, zoals zrj het uatdruklen, werd ingegcareii door 
pragirianischc redenen van meetbaarheid c11 databescliikbaarheId, naaar de toenemende bel-ioefte 
aan meer psycholagrscbe variabele11 in 'upper echelons' studies werd daarna lierhaalclel~lk 
gemeld door orider~ockers Bijna tlein jaar latcr, bijvoorbeeld, stellcn Ha!-inbrick, Gelctkai?ycz en 
Frcdericksoi~ dat "(.. ) hoewel psyct~ollog!sche factoren van, ccritralil bclai:g zijir in de iipper 
echelons tl~eoiic, worden dergelijke fenomenen zelden direct bestudeerd a i  geniekil Ln 
empit-isch ondeïzoek ilaar top managers" (oizzc vertaliiïg) Zelfs tot op heden blijft onderdoek 
riaar de invloed vat1 psycliologisclze dnversitent op inatzagement-gerelatad gedrag een lactiiie i n  
de 'zipper cchclons9raditie. Onze skudie tracht een aanzet te geven om de1.e lac~irie te dlchien 
S-fleronder geren we een otci-~ichl van de uitkolnsten kcrkregcn ~t11 liel \oorlii;;ende 
dissartatieoiider~oek naar de invloed dic de psycl.rollogische snnrenstcll~rig van een groep 
beslissers hccfi op hun keuzes en gedrag n11 een niailagernent simulatie. Daartoe zrillcri live ceist 
kort ~ngaaii op Izel persoonlijB~eiciskenrnerk dat ceiltraal stond In dere studie, i?arnelqk Je 
zogei~a,iindc 'percepti~ van coritiole' (Ylacus ol'control' ril het Engels) V e ~ o l ~ e r i s  bespreken we 
al-is aigcmeile oiiclcrzaeksii~odcl ei? d e  restillaLeal. Wc sluiten aiiiiet een conclusie 
I,ocus viuti crrriirole cir het gedrag vaam managers 
Ecii riitgcbrend ovclz~clil v u l  her: perccptle van coii'trole oiuderrpoek \r crd gegeven i i i  I~oofdstnik 3 
bic! begrip 'pcrccptie v m  ~a~i i ro le '  stamt ij l t  de sucnalc lecriihcorie van3 J~ilian Rottcr ( 1  966) cir 
vciw~jst n:i,ir dc rn:tlc waarin iiidlviduen nricnen ('per~lgiCr.eri') dat lielgeen hei? ovcrkoinx ie 
bvrjtcn o i  te daiiiken 1s aim lietizelf (dst nic7~11ieil WC een1 iizjcrrie perceptie var1 coiitrolc) of aan 
facioreir b~iitcil I-ienzclf (eet1 exterisc-. perceptie \.,i11 controle) Mernscia me1 cetl ijltei-ne perccptic 
viili C C P I I I ~ O P C  (1~~~1.11iiieg I ~ I ~ I ! I ~ I ~  genoemd), zoeken cle oorzaak van wat ben owerkoilrr~ lnr hun  
c~gcii geiltag, \?,iardlgl.ietien of tckortkoiizirigcir Mensen itlct een ii-iecr cxtenrc pcrccptse va11 
oronrrolc (oficwcl eutenien) wanen ncli passieve agenten 111 hl111 le\;crli, LU wi~tew of daiilken V, at. 
cr gebeuil aai1 zaken als gcliik, toeval or  i~iachtlgt; personen. Diit algetiletie verschtl i11 
irigesicldlzcsc8 liecll verregaande catrsequeiïiws voor Condemieer) tciakgcrlcilit gedrag \ai1 ijlelisei?, 
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xodls op schooP en op her werk' Hef: empirisch onderzoek tot op hede11 Paal. zie11 dat antemer.r in 
hel algemeen beter presteren in prestatlegericlrt gedrag, zoals nlanagemeiit dam exteliieti 
(LeCcorurt. 1982; Boone, 1992). Dit stemt oliereen met de int~itie, immers: Tvalneer nien tiet 
gevoel ~ieeA geen rnvlaed te hebben op de ultkornstzn van Izcii ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ J ~ S I I I O C ~ S  (zoals exten~crn), is 
het nogal zunloos olm een actie\ e, gemaliveerde houdang aan de dag te leggeil: je actles doecl er 
roch ureinig toe. Aan de: andere kamt. a15 je wel het gevoreP liebt dat Je de zaken irr  de Iirind hebt 
en d e  resuiilalezi kunt beinvloelden Qzoals internen), levert dl1 celli krachtige nlotivatue 0171 de 
an-rgevlng eiì het werk actief tegenloet Xe trede11 en Irard te werk-~teil?. Op Yaet vlak rdn 
nauanagermei~t blijken bedrijven geleld door ~nien-re bcdr-ijFsleiders ook ialderdaad beacr te 
presteren dal1 bedr~jveir niet externe managers aai1 het roer, en dit zowel op korte als op Iaiige 
tesnarjm (Milles and Toulouse, 1986; Boone er al , 10396) De grote vraag blijfi echter waarani 
precles? 111 ons onderzoek traclalen we die vraag te bearitwooi-dei1 aaiisliu~tcnd op zowel 
verkliurrngen uit liel verleden als lilieuwe inzich-iieil Bovei~dien verlegger) we voos het ecnst de 
aandacht van ~ndlriduele managers iuadr (kleine) groepjes vim beslissers Per slat van rckei-iiii~g 
worden belangrijke beslissingen in bel hedendaagse bedrijrsleveii r i l  raueerderlne~d i11 
teamverband genoluien De ceiiiriule vraag in I-iet onderhavage anc2cr~oek is daii ook: Zijiz er 
verschrllen in beArqfsj~resta8ies tussen teams die een versc2-iillciidur IIIIX ~cr1-1 iiiatcrnlie c11 externe 
ai~d~viducn hebben'? En zo ja waarom? 
Met is nog vali belang te venilelden dat de effecten van prersoo~~lqkheid op besl~ssingc~i 
in het algenleeni het sterkst zijn in relatief onzekere, L~n~bigue situafies (ook wel aangeduid als 
'ueak stl~iations" in tegenstelilung tot stabiele. duudelijk gestcucltureerde situaties ('sirong 
ss~uatricmiis') De reden hle~vaor is, dal men in de eerste s~nuatie veel ininder kan vet-trouwcn op 
metli~odes en zieizswijzen, waardoor ieders persooniijke bcnaderiilg ritcer tol 
uitdrtmkklng komt iii liet gedrag. Zo valt dus te veiwaci~ten daii de erkcten vuil psychalogisclze 
varirmt~e biimen teams in eein bedrijfsse'ating sterker zwlliei~ sijn in meer dyi~anmlsclle 
bcdrqfcomgev~ngen dan 111 relatief stabiele en vaarspelbare arngevingcii. We 'bronae1-i hier nul; op 
terug. 
Tlirenretisrhe aclrtergrond: eeni model 
In begiiiscl mezien WIJ,  dat ve~scl~iYien 111 bcdrijfspresiaties aan een tweetal &aken toe Le sclirijben 
 aud den kwnrieau tljni Teil eerste kan hel !c  ii~;iken h~bbci3 inet di: rnlioirir' zan de gevoerdc 
silraitegiieëii, d w z. het ene team neemt andere edof  belere stratcgischc besIrssmgen dan1 IreL 
andere. Zo bestaan er aanwijzingen dat inten.ie managers nzcer inriovatievc en proactleve ~ C L P L ~ ~  
inaken of ziaecr risico ncniien, riliet ailidere woorden: onidcmet.i~cncler t l J n  (Millcr cl al., 1982. 
M11iYcr, 1983, Millcr and Toulousc, 1986). Ecn tweede ~i-iogel~lkheid Ireeft eclutcr in het vcrleclcri 
i lauwel~~ks  aandacht gekegen D e ~ e  ha~idt in dat cantinie g~erceplics een bei:ingi-j~iie invloed 
~iirocleilen op de nianier wirarrjp straiiegiietni, worden geuoinld, i n  de Arigelsaksiscl~e literatuur 
aailgeduïd met het moe~lijk vertaalbare kstia:cgy naiuk~ng' Wij rqn  van imlcniiay dat de 
siiperioriteif va71 intcnie over externe managers [inede) gelegen zou ktira~aen zijli in ~ a k e i r  als 
\'oor een uitgebreid overzicht van de irnplicalies kan verscliilleirdc conlsolie perceplics ric I,eFcouiZ 
( l  952) 
We geven hier uiteraard voor de doideiljktleld even dc euiremi pusi~iss van (7eer) interne cru 
extenie managers weer. In de praktijk komi het neer op ~cicciiilllcn i11 een rileer of minder 
urigcspmkcri geneigdheid 1st externe dan wcl. ~ntcmc  percel3tiec vali controle 
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betere infoolnnabie-inwinn~ng, bcdn-ijfsplannang, interne consistentae van strategieen (loc van hun 
iniioud) alsmede een goed doordaclite en t~jdige aanpassing ervan. 
Deze verwaclrtingei~ hangen alPeir samen niet het feit dat internen ons inz~ens beter 
gcrnotiveerd cri i n  staal Lijn lot cfoclelger~rht gedrag (opnieuw los van de  inhcaiid vaan dat gedrag) 
Doelgenclut gedrag vcrondcrstelt de volgende componenfcn, die rqn weergegeven in figuur 1 
Piguur 1: Conceptueel raamwerk wan doelgerichte strategievorrnimg 
Op de  eerste plaats dient mein ;lijn omgeving i11 kaart Le brengen iniddels het roeken van 
relevaiitc inlornuiiatic over de  iiiterzie ei1 cxtenle omgevirig. Experirneiilen eii ~~eldstudies  (Phares, 
1 1941) hebben olierhuigendi aangetoond dat interaien actievere infomatiezoekers zijn dan 
cxlenreir Dit sleii-rt overeen iricl de isittiilie: de eigen effectiviteit waarin internen geloven wordt 
ilainelijk nanz~enlijk verhoogd als men weel oiider welke omsian.idiglzcdei~ nheir moet opereren. 
'$ooi. exteraien voegt informatic weinig toe. 
De tweede coinpolient belielsr l-iet ondemcrirerz van samenhangende acties door nziddcl 
van ii:iiiwke~i~igc plai-ii~ing col liet ontwlkkelen vasr een intern coi~sisteizl belcrd. Planning als 
rlicthoclur utar d c  toekomst voorspelbaarder te niaken is een typiscll kenmerk vair iiltcrn 
gcuiibnrccrcie ~ndiv~cl~ien (Millci aiid Toulouue, 10XGa; Miller, Kets de Vrics and Touluz~sc, 
Ig8s; hiliíbes, 12)83), exisrncia zullen es de zin riioeilijic wan i n  kunnen &leil. Iets dergelijks gciilt 
ook  tooi= de bclcidsconsistentie. Het hele idee van strlategic als  ecrn bcwuct ~ecoiiligirrccrd 
actiepah-uon olm een bepaald doel te bercikem, is iets wat op basis van hei voorga~nde  sterker 
olider LLILC~-IIL"II d m  oiidor exiealen zal Icwcs? We verwachteir dun ook dat intcrnern 21ch 111eet 
iïioc~te ziiElsn getroosten aimz eeii gocde sdii~eïll~nng in Iiuii beslissingen aan IC brengen dan 
ex lcr-ncii 
l-let lastsic elcii~ent in figuur I is Iicit aaiipassingsgedrag De elfecli~,itcit wan d c  straicgz 
rs er iiiier'laud bij gcbnat dar z4 word[ aat~gep,~ist ~iidieii daar redeir toe hestaal, liij\oorbeeld naai 
~lanleidiirg van tcgei~-\rallende resiiltailcn D11 Ea*rastc clenrent voegt dus een dpnnrisctre 
~oïi~poiicïit  a'in lict n-ioclel loc. Ilct ligt \oor  de linix! ie verondcrsrellcn dal icmand die liieent cel? 
kckcre bel-iccrcing te Izebbcil over \+at hem (of L?JII organisatie) overkoixt (d w z. een ni~~eriic) 
rich liiseilijLcr nair de vcrant\hoordel~jkheid voor sleclite resuliaten zal kunnen oiittrckicn. FIq 
zal in Irct :algeiiiezii ook meei het gsvael Ihebbeti c11 de molwatie hebben oruu er ez.enluecl wat aai1 
[ c  Irunl~eai cloen. Oncierzock blgkt deze digemene 1 eiwacl~ting ir bevesiigcn zij \vust duidelqk i11 
de riclitirig ~ ~ 1 x 1  ccn trogei aanpiissriigs\:cmlogcaz en aaiipassingseflcct~\~iteit o~idcl- irurerncn 
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(Pharcs, Wjisotl and Klyver, 1971; Srsull arud Karahenick, 197.5, Andersoii, 1977; '%splnr\!ail arzd 
Taylor, 1993. Tezamen valt te irewaclzten dat de gerioenlde drie elementen bijdragen aan dc, 
reeds vastgestelde, belere bedrijfspresiaties van isrlerne managers dm vasi externe managers. 
besprak de  gevolgde mclli~odc vaij hel proetselxniI. Een beimgaljkc tekortkoming 
" J P P ~ ~  echelonsn onderzoek in het verlede11 1s de lieterogejalkeit v m  de sleekprocven. 
Eotendi@n werden persoonl?jl<4leidske11merke11 veeia1 niet gelneten om redenen l.ar1 prac2isclle 
aard. naailagers werken liter rilel graag aarr mee. liSfij hebben geprobeerd deze bez\-vapen te 
ondenfall%en door onze hypotheses eerst eens in een relatief geconfrojeerde anagevlrig v a  een 
'managemenzt gaa-rie' te toetsen Mrddels medewerkiirg van de orgaiiisatoren Iran dit gkme kaliden 
we  alle deelnerneïs persaonlijk benaderen voor deelnaalie a a l  ons onderzoek. Onze studie is dus 
uitgeboerd In de experin.ienicle setting van eeia groatsciialige inrteiilatilonale nlarlagei-rrienl 
cuntpelitie (ZMC) die jaariljks georganiseerd wordt door MCC Inteinationai b.v. i11 Amsterdm 
Deelneiners z1j1-1 teams van veelal jonge uiranagers van bedrtjven uit geheel Europa. Deze 
bedri~ven schrijven Iiun teanas 111eesaal in als otderdeel .cali een ?nariagement dcvelopnzent' oT 
traunil~gs programma. En de door ons onderzoclite edut~e 1994 vaia Yaet spel deden leaiilis van 167 
'nedrqtcti nzee Elk karn leudt een ficluef produc~iebedrlji, opererend op drie verschiliende 
markten. Onze steekproef bcstomd uil 5 8  volledige t eam,  vimërerid i i i  grootle van 2 IQ 7 
leariilecieia niel een grote meerderheid van 4 Iiedeia. De gemiddelde leeflijd was oi-ige.r~eer 33 jaar, 
88% was Nederlands en eeiltelfde percentage was rmiu~ Voor ozis orrderzoek ailalysecrdci~ we 
een reeks van besllssilngen die door teams wesderr gem:i&t In zes apeeiavolgende zogz~iaantde 
spelperiodec. In elkc periode moeten de teams een bcslissingsforrnxnYier ~nvullen mei 37 
bcsiissingscategoneh vasierend van (iilwestenngen in) productie (capaeiteil en kwaliteit), 
marketing (prijszetting, reclame, verkoopbevorclcriligr, fiilanciering Qlencn-ailossen), personeel 
(aanname, training, ontslag, verloop) tot informatieverzamellng ('business intclllgence" eer1 
R&D. Groepen \.an vijf Leams vornlen telkeias een bedrijfstak waarin zij moelen eoiicun-ere17 
leger1 vier anderen: een "eratapolie' dus. Als onderpoekers hadden we h~erdocir de Iriescl~nkking 
over allc beslissingeri die gei~o~nen werden, alle resultaten van de bedrijven en, mlddels 
enq~iercs, p c r s o o n l ~ j e i d s a  el, anderc acl~tergrondgege~cns van de deelnemers uit de 
steekproef 
I,QCUS van coiltrouile werd gemeteil niet eer1 gevalideerde vragenli~st o~inlecnd aan Rnllcr 
(1966) Respondenten werd gevraagd om iclkerrs ecn kcwx te i~~akeru wcik van twee s t a ~ e l ~ l e i ~ ~ ~  
hei! nzeesl lE~ll ovefluiging weergar ["orccci chaice tenlïat'). Eik paar a!lematievcn bcsiond uit 
een1 exrezile variai3t [bijlv. "succes in hel ieweti is een kwestie van geluk") en een iirlierme vi~ridnl 
(bijv. 'succes kali worden bereik! door hard te werken') De ernels~ore wordt berekcnd door hel 
arisillrl exteme ;~ltemafieveil dal gekozen werd op tc tellen. Aan dur hand van de mediaanscores QP 
de pePcooin[jJheids~rd.ge;lllJst werden alle respandente1-i il?icn-r of extern gec la~~~f icec rd  
-rcanls inct meer dan 2 /3  1ntenrep-1 werden als "intcriie teains' aangeimerkt, LhJ nact lllecr dan 2/3 
externril .als 'exlemc teanisken de rcst als 'gemengde lcarns'. 
bedriJïSlaa<. waarin de teams opereerden werd als stabiel ob dyrnumisch aa1lg@nie"kl 
alc ]ia,ld di: orn\rdng kan de prtjssc'nomrnel~ngc~~ ei1 dc grootte val1 de berschuiwrngcn in  
dc lilarktaandeleia die twiscenti~ds opzrddeil. 
Resultaten 
we zUien ons in hei vanwege de ruimte beperken tot de hoofdli~nen w-i onze 
bcv~ndingcn 
n i s  eerste werd in I-joofdstuk 5 gekeken af interne teains grasso modo ~ndsrdaad bctcr 
(qua winst cn behaald marklaandeel) dan externe ei1 gemengde teaims. Dil bleek 
jnderd& het gcval te r.ijn. en wel het sterkst rn djnarn~sche ~rngc\~ingen. ~pvalicncf was dc 
pre.;Vdtie *.m gemengde teams: zij deden h d  veruit het slechtct van de drie Mogele1k 
komL dil door het feit dat gemengde teams (zoals alle heterogeen sa~laengestelde teams) nag elen 
exlra hadder:, namelijk cen gebrek aan goedc sociale ~ntegratie. Bli~kbaar is dst in 
dynamische arngevingen van extra groot belang Het belang wan psychcrlcrgiscl-ie vanalie ln  de 
verklarfrap van prestatievcrschrllen~ mogc blijken unt het feit dar dcze verschillen i n  dynarninsciiie 
bedrijF5calnken maar laefst 47% van de vanatic: in de acntabiliteit van hcr engen vermogen kunnen 
verklareni 
Ter vcrklanng van deze preslatieverschillcil werd In Hoofdstuk 6 eerst gekeken nf  ze ie 
makctil I~adden met dc ~wiSioïrd wan de strategische keuzes dio gemaakt warere. Dit bleek in hei 
algemeen i~lct het geval te zijn Interne teams waren genliddeld nteb innovatiever, cofiper~tncver 
of meer i-oc~co-n~crncnd daili externc tean-rs Echter: eer] interecsan~te interactie bleek te bestaan 
inet de mate van on1gewingsdy1~~lali2ieik Dar wil  zegge^^: indeme teams invcstcerden alleen nnser 
nn innovatie of samenwerkmg ufai.inecr dat in het spel proîíjteli~k was, marneiljk rri dynalnisciue 
omgevingcl1 P31t w2jst enop dat ~n~ei-ne t ams iaiet noodzakelijk andere beslissi~ligesi neniei-i, 
maar dut zc hun beslissingen betcr aatpis.se;rl arin de situatie, ze Pijken een bctere ileus te hcbben 
wooi welk gedrag; rneer gepasi is onder bepaalde omsbandighederi. Dit zal een reraigkercizde 
bevirtding blij ken te z1ji-t. 
Teil aczrrzien val de verschillen in strategievoônuirig, d . ~  z. de manier witur-op ~Lraccgiecii 
tot stmnrl kornerr (zie f i g~~ua  l), werd i n  Hao1FCEstuk 7 het volgelide geworiden. In tegenstelling tot 
onze vemraehting bleken de teams niet te verscliillea~ cn de lotale hoeveelheict geld die zij 
lillgaven aan hei kopen van infomalie Wanneer we echter kijken naar de mate \hianriii 
bpecitieke acties doar leams ondeimomei~ voorafgegaan werden door een voor die beslissing 
relevant inîoimatle~ier~oek werden wel belaiigrijke vcrschi~len gevoridcn Interne teams hluken 
zich voordgaand aan ecsn bcslhsstiig beter dan externe teanms te informeren over zakcn d ~ e  te 
iiliukcna Irebbcn iiiet de ~J'fcrnitrrell bult J I U I I  ergers hurideleir. Dit \wijst op een deker. pragn~atisine 
vaiz dc zijde VU!] interne tcarns: zc zijn geïnleressecrd in wat hut/ acties k~innesl ixtekcn~iiri 
Externe leains daarcn-iiegcn bleken ineer yeii~teresseerd ~n allet lel zakeil aangaande de acties \ a i>  
co~~c\irrsnlei-i; i ~ u s i  bhiteia geiichle infonnatle dus. Uni analyse blijkt, dat het verzallielen van 
l i ~ h i x ~ a t i e  in hct spel een BcBaiigriiRere bijdrage aai? d e  prestaties lcveaa in dyrnamische dam 111 
slabielc oiïigevii~geti. Iliacrne tcums blijkei3 dit goed te hebbcir aangevoeld zc zijn actievere 
in~o~irrër:riie1~erz51me1n;~rs rn dync~niisclie dan lil stabiele omgeviragen. Externe teams betonen ~ i c l l  
OpIllE11\'9 sleclrlc aai~passcrs: zij doci~ precies liet omgekeerde. 
Een s ~ o r ~ g ~ l l ~ k  resultaat werd verkregen ten aarizien van & kwaliteit van Je 
pld11111tlg~111~13an11llngeir I tcriicn blijkeci In lict algcimieen hct best %c planr-ierl, maar kei zbjn niet 
de exlerrien maar de gernengdc teams dic het hier liet slecl-its~ doen Aangeniell een gocdci 
arsterilmin% itiscen bedqfConderdelcil bier enislaal is, hebben de inleprarie ertiof 
connni~iriicaine~~zoe~~~jkI~edct~ van g ineiigdc ieams zicll hier mogcli~ k het z%vaarsC laten gcvozlen 
Wanaieer we de zierscllillen taisceii s~abocle n dynraniischc arngevinlgcn besclrouzveri, 7icnl \\,e dal 
externen hot besle p~lariiaen in stabicle orngevirigcni ena internen Izet beste plalncn in dyilamische 
oiiige\riiigeai. Plaizi1iaigskwal1rci1 blijkt sterker geassoclcci-d inel dinancieel succes in dyrii~rinlsciic 
omgevingeil, icls wat ilnt~iitief te bcgrljpeii valt ecn slechte bedrijfsplannrrig is \+aaiscEiUrilgk 
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kostbaarder In een snel veranderende ~mgeving dan ingeval alles redelijk voorspelbanï verloopt 
Intemen lijken deze gedachte op umade geschat te hebben: ze plarinea~ beter inaarmate plmning 
noodzakelijker en (bugevolg) profijtelijker is Me! andere tvoordeti: ze 1iertonei.i aalgepaster 
gedrag. 
De inten~e samenhang van de strategieën dle de t e m s  oiat~v~lckelden bleek nzet te 
verschillen. Echter, interne teams bleken ininder interne coherentie in huil srtrategie$nn te 
vertonen rn dynamische dar1 in stabiele omgevingen. Het omgekeerde geldt voor t-xtcrne team.  
Dit wijst erop dal interne teams hun strategieEiz Vosser' definiEerden als de omgeving 
veraniderlijker was dar In geval z?j relatief stabiel was. Hoewel dit te begrijpen ki i l t  als eet1 
poging om mees strategische: kalmslag' te houden in dylan~ische: bedrijfsrakken, bleek hel. in dit 
geval niel profijtelijker te zijn. Als we kijken naar de vasll-ioilcle~~dheid aan bepaalde strategische 
profielen nuer de tsjd zie12 we geen verschillen lussen team types: allen zujn ongeveer even 
persistent in hu12 keuzes voor een bepaald profiel Tach durkt oak hier hci trimiddels vertrouwde 
kwalitatieve patroon op intemeli zijn persistenter dan andere. teamtypes In stabiele omgewiilgen 
(wemg reden om te veraiidererr als hct werkt), maar het verscl-iil verdwijnt in een dynai~~lsclic 
bsdr~j beantext. 
In de hierboverm. genoemde resultaten w e ~ d  aangetoond dat de superioriteit van intenze 
teams nnogelûjk niet gelegen is in wal ze doen inaar arzdcr welke oiiisramdighedc~~ ze wat dueii. 
Het lijkt erop alsof interne teams eerzvoudig een beter gevoel laebben voor passend gedrag 
afharikelijk van de oinstandiglzederi. In een pogtng on-i dil aarrpassingseiFect (zie figuur l )  
directer te obscntereri weid in Hoofdstuk S gekcken naai. strategisclzc ~erainderingsreac~ies op 
resultatenkcdback, m a.w hoeveel verandert men naar aanleiding vaii slechte picseaties7 
Externen bleken in het algenneen het naeest onrustig te Z I ~ I I .  0tlpeac111 hu11 presiatres warein ZIJ het 
meeste aan ket veranderen Ecn sooi? continue onmst 1Gkt huti gedrag ie typeren, oi~geacl-it de 
omstandigheden De reaches op negatieve prestatie-feedback bleek alleen in het beg111 var1 het 
spel een rol te spelen; daarna waren de team resultaten niet n-ieer van invloed op de I~oeiieelheid 
herandering. Wel is het zo, dat extenic teanis rneer inoeik leken le hebben om een gppasie 
react~e op negatieve feedback te geven Qin precies te ~ i j n :  re verandcrdei~ brwel heel sterk 
OlweP heel weinig, m.a.w. de vanatie in hlin veranderingen was hoger dan clie van andcre teanas 
Tczanrrn genomen naogen we coizcluderen dal tie aanpassing vdii gedrag crucia~l I S  i11 de 
verklaring van pres~atuelverschillm tussen verschillende teamtypes L.ocus van conliolc is ceil 
belangrijk psyclaologisch kenmerk 0111 het gedrag va11 iliianagers (c verklareli 13ailrc ui~alyse kooiri 
aan dat dit zeer ocker ook geldt op het karn niveau. Maar zoals La vaak i17 de 
organirsatiewrete11sc11~1ppc1~ is de rol van de omgebing van pronuinent l~elairg. Psycl~olog~s~lrc 
kcili?~erkeii, eili dus; ook het o~lderlaaz.ige, hebben dc sterkste verkllarirrgsköach i13 oinrgevrngen die 
aiiibiguc: en orizeker zijn Daar is hei dat managers tcniggeworpen &orden op hun ialeest 
fili~dai-iientelc eigcnscl~appen ei1 gcdrdgs~endenties 
